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Abstract 
Key Words: Process Hazards Analysis, HAZOP, PrHA, Hazard Evaluation 
CH2M HILL Hanford Group, Inc., has expanded the scope and increased the formality of 
process hazards analyses performed on new or modified Tank Farm facilities, designs, and 
processes. The CH2M HILL process hazard analysis emphasis has been altered to reflect its use 
as a fundamental part of the engineering and change control process instead of simply being a 
nuclear safety analysis tool. The scope has been expanded to include identification of 
accidentdevents that impact the environment, or require emergency response, in addition to 
those with significant impact to the facility worker, the offsite, and the 100-meter receptor. Also, 
there is now an expectation that controls will be identified to address all types of consequences. 
To ensure that the process has an appropriate level of rigor and formality, a new engineering 
standard for process hazards analysis was created. 
This paper discusses the role of process hazards analysis as an information source for not only 
nuclear safety, but also for the worker-safety safety management programs, emergency 
management, environmental programs. This paper also discusses the role of process hazards 
analysis in the change control process, including identifying when and how it should be applied 
to changes in design or process. 
Introduction 
CH2M HILL Hanford Group, Inc. (CH2M HILL) developed the Tank Farms Documented Safety 
Analysis (DSA) to comply with the requirements of 10 CFR 830, “Nuclear Safety 
Management”’. The DSA is structured according to the guidance contained in 
DOE-STD-3009-94, Preparation Guide,for U S .  Department of Energy Nonreactor Nuclear 
Facility Documented Safety Analyses‘. When the DSA was approved it was thought that 
following its requirements would ensure that no events would occur with unacceptable 
consequences. Time has proved that we were both right and wrong. We have had no events that 
have exceeded DSA risk acceptance levels. What we have learned, however, is that unacceptable 
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consequences and DSA risk acceptance levels are not one and the same. In learning this lesson, 
we have again discovered that with any endeavor the importance of addressing all the details. 
This paper discusses the importance in addressing what is implied in the guidance for process 
hazards analysis contained in DOE-STD-3009-94 through reference to 29 CFR 1910.1 19, 
“Process Safety Management of Highly Hazardous  chemical^"^. The detail is imbedded in the 
Management of Change (MOC). This paper addresses how to structure process hazards analysis 
to support MOC within the context of a nonreactor nuclear facility. 
In the Beginning 
CH2M HILL developed the Tank Farms DSA, in accordance with DOE-STD-3009-94, by 
identifying and analyzing various hazards located in Tank Farm facilities and associated with 
Tank Farm processes. The hazard analysis was primarily focused on developing technical safety 
requirements- (TSR-) level controls to protect the public and the onsite worker. TSR level 
controls for the facility worker were also considered for hazards that could result in significant 
exposure to the effects of radiation, toxicity, tires, and explosions. This resulted in changes to 
designs and processes being evaluated with a focus on DSA accident levels of concern. 
However, this focus resulted in two problems: 
A tendency to treat each change in an isolated setting 
Limited identification of design and operational improvements that would provide 
additional protection for the facility worker and reduction of uncontrolled environmental 
releases. 
The focus also resulted in limited development of information related to potentially higher 
frequency events with lower consequences that would be important to emergency response 
planning. 
The Solution - CH2M HILL Process Hazards Analysis 
Integrating MOC with hazard analysis requires a fundamental shift in thinking about where the 
process hazards analysis (PrHA) fits within the big picture of managing and performing work at 
Tank Farm Contractor (TFC) facilities. Instead of the hazard analysis process being a nuclear 
safety analysis tool that is used primarily to create and maintain a DOE-STD-3009-94 compliant 
DSA, the PrHA process is now part of the CH2M HILL engineering design process. The PrHA 
process does not replace other processes, but is instead intended to complement the design 
review process, job hazard analysis, as low as reasonably achievable (ALARA) work planning, 
as well as other existing safety management program owned processes. 
The use of the term “PrHA” instead of “PHA” to denote “process hazards analysis” is taken from 
DOE-HDBK-1100-2004, Chemical Process Hazards Analysis4. Use of “PHA” for process 
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hazards analysis tends to create confusion because the preliminary hazards analysis process 
described in MIL-STD-882, Standard Practice,for System Sufi?$, has historically been referred 
to as PHA. 
The CH2M HILL PrHA process uses, as its basis, 29 CFR 1910.1 19. Two parts of this CFR are 
key: Process Hazards Analysis - Paragraph (e) which requires all covered facilities to have a 
documented PrHA that uses an approved method, and Management of Change - Paragraph (1) 
which requires a written program to manage changes to a facility/process, including changes to 
procedures. The approach to performing a PrHA is based on performance-oriented requirements 
so the type of analysis that best addresses a particular change may be chosen. In essence, 
29 CFR 191 0.1 19 requires ALL changes to undergo some level of review. 
The CH2M HILL PrHA process is implemented through a PrHA procedure, a PrHA screening 
form, and a PrHA performance standard. The procedure defines the process used to determine 
when new, and changed TFC projects, processes, equipment, and documents requires a PrHA. In 
addition, when a PrHA is determined to be required, the procedure defines the standards to be 
used for performing the PrHA. The PrHA screening process is part of the procedure and is 
documented on a PrHA screening form. The form ensures implementation of key requirements 
of the MOC process that is similar to that defined in 29 CFR 191 0. I 19. Guidance related to the 
specifics of PrHA technique selection and performance is provided in the standard. Figure 1 
shows a graphical depiction of the process. 
The CH2M HILL PrHA process is structured to be iterative because nearly all new 
projects/processes or modification of facilities/processes can be characterized in phases of 
activity that have progressively greater design and process detail. Changes/improvements 
identified during the PrHA are always best addressed as early as possible in the 
desigdmodification process. The PrHA procedure uses the following project-related terms to be 
consistent with DOE 0 413.3A, Program and Project Management,for the Acquisition of 
Capital Assets6: 
1. Conceptual design 
2. Preliminary design 
3. Detailed design 
4. Construction 
5. Commissioning 
6 .  Operations. 
Changes in system design, process, or procedures can also have phases, but the phases are often 
condensed or abbreviated. In any case, the PrHA process is not considered complete until there 
are no further changes before startup. 
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Figure 1. Overview Flowchart of Process Hazard Analysis Process. 
- 
Specifics of the PrHA Process 
Hazard Identification 
Information for all process chemicals, chemical reaction products, process materials, and 
operating conditions is required to be compiled before PrHA team meetings are held. The 
information is used during the team meetings to confirm or adjust assumptions about energy 
sources and hazardous or radioactive material. This information is also essential for the safety 
Page 4 of 13 
management programs to ensure that chemical, radiological, and industrial hazards are 
appropriately addressed for the protection of the facility worker and the environment. 
Hazard Evaluation 
The PrHA process requires a team approach to hazard analysis. The team approach is key to a 
successful PrHA. Furthermore, the CH2M HILL PrHA process requires that the team perform its 
deliberations in a meeting/workshop format. Three types of individuals are required to make up 
the team: 
A qualified leader 
Subject matter experts. 
A recorder (also referred to as a scribe or secretary) 
All PrHA workshops are required to have a predefined quorum of individuals that must be 
present to ensure that the hazard evaluation process produces valid results. The quorum may 
include supplemental team members as deemed necessary by the PrHA Team leader and 
management. 
The minimum quorum consists of a team leader, a recorder, and a core group of the following 
subject matter experts: 
Operations representative(s) 
Cognizant Nuclear Safety and Licensing safety analyst(s) 
Responsible engineer that is most knowledgeable of the desigdsystedactivity being 
evaluated, for example: 
- 
- 
- Responsible process engineer 
Industrial safetyhygiene representative 
Radiation protection program representative. 
Responsible project engineer (if a project) 
Responsible system engineer (if what is being evaluated has one assigned) 
The workshop meetings are structured to capture hazardous conditions representing a spectrum 
of accidents, as well as a spectrum of consequences and Erequencies within each type of accident. 
The hazard evaluation team takes no credit with regard to the effects of preventive or mitigative 
controls such as equipment or component qualification, procedural actions, administrative 
requirements, or beneficial failure modes. 
The evaluation team evaluates engineered protective design features that are included in the 
equipment or process being evaluated in two ways. Initially, the team identifies conditions taking 
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no credit for this equipment being installed (e.g., secondary containment on a transfer line is not 
included in the evaluation). The team also considers the conditions of the actual design (e.g., 
secondary containment installed as designed) to identify the impacts of upsets based on the 
system as intended. 
Hazard Evaluation Technique Selection 
Physical Changes to Facilities/Systems/Processes 
PrHAs are required to use structured and systematic approaches. Hazard evaluation techniques 
are selected based on the scale and phase of project or change under evaluation: The following 
are the categories into which CHZM HILL divides changes: 
Management Selected Projects/Modifications 
Projects 
Major Changes 
Minor Changes. 
It should be noted that Minor Changes do not require a formal PrHA. However, this does not 
imply that no hazard analysis is performed because the normal processes that CH2M HILL uses 
to control work in the Tank Farms are still applied. 
For new projects conducted in fill1 accordance with DOE 0 413.3A, evaluations are conducted at 
each stage of the project as follows. 
Conceptual Design Phase (once preliminary concept design established and process flow 
diagrams, process description, and waste inventory or flowsheet are available) 
- 
- What-IfiChecklist 
- PHA 
Preliminary/Detailed Design Phase (once piping and instrumentation diagrams [P&ID] 
are developed, control logic is defined, and facility/equipment layout is established.) 
- 
- 
Preliminary Hazard and Operability Analysis (HAZOP) 
Full HAZOP for tank waste processing, retrieval, and transfer systems 
What-if Checklist - for simple well-defined changes, systems not suited to HAZOP, 
and procedures 
Other techniques for specific systems (e.& computer HAZOP, failure-mode effects 
analysis [FMEA], event tree) 
- 
Detailed Design/Construction/Commissioning/Operations (in many cases a PrHA will 
have been conducted during preliminary and detailed design) 
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- 
- 
Full HAZOP for major changes affecting multiple components/systerns 
Delta HAZOP of less extensive changes (HAZOP of P&lD/drawings) focused 
mainly on changes and interfaces 
What-if Checklist - for simple well-defined changes, systems not suited to HAZOP, 
and procedures 
FMEA - for automated systems with limited human interaction 
- 
- 
Other techniques can be selected if the change is not appropriately evaluated by a 
HAZOP, What-if Checklist, or FMEA. However, approval of the technique by 
management is required and justification of the techniques selected is documented in the 
hazard evaluation report. 
For new expense-funded projects and other smaller projects which do not include all the project 
stages specified in DOE 0 413.3A, a PrHA is required before authorization of startup. However, 
it must be conducted sufficiently in advance to enable PrHA results to be incorporated into the 
process and equipment design. 
Like DOE 0 413.3A-compliant projects, the exact technique to be used for new expense- 
funded projects and other smaller projects is established on the PrHA screening form. 
The normal techniques are the same: 
- FullHAZOP 
- Delta HAZOP 
- What-if Checklist 
- FMEA. 
Major changes made to new expense-funded projects and other smaller projects during 
construction or facility startup are also required to be evaluated. 
Other techniques for new expense-funded projects and other smaller projects may be 
selected if the change is not appropriately evaluated by the standard techniques. As with 
major projects, approval of the evaluation technique by management is required and 
justification of the techniques selected is documented in the PrHA report. 
Changes to Procedures 
It has been shown that component analysis identifies only a few human errors, whereas 
procedure analysis is able to reveal most human errors related to procedures, training, and 
ergonomics. Most significant accidents occur during non-routine operations. CH2M HILL 
evaluates changes to procedures through a process referred to as “Procedure Analysis.” The 
process provides a systematic way to analyze procedures to identify potential sources of human 
error. Figure 2 presents a graphical depiction of the procedure analysis process. 
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PrHA Procedure Analysis Process Flow Diagram 
I. I s  flier^ 1 miisinq rlcp? 
2. Wlmf i f fhe  step 1) 
inromplrfel? petfonnrd? 
f--+ 
~ ~~~ 
The procedure doe5 not describe an 
action taken during. or immediately 
before. thecurrent Step(i.e.. the 
procedure is not writken correcny) 
What if any or all actions required by the step 3 . . .... . . 
current step are not performed? 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
4. 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
L--- 5. 
Evaluate adequacy of safeguards that preventlmitigate 
propagation of the error (identify changes as necessary) 
Safcguarda are StaterncntS containing: 
- e"s"R. 
-check 
- veiify 
- inspect 
or. are cautionary statements that have the consequence 
of being skipped that result in "loss o l a  lcvel of 
~rotection against.. ." 
Go to next step in the procedure 
Figure 2. Procedure Analysis Process. 
Procedure analysis is intended as a complement to the analysis of processes, systems, and 
components. 
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The procedure analysis process uses either guide words similar to HAZOP to review the 
procedure or the following What-if questions: 
Is anything missing from this step‘? 
What if this step (or any part of it) is not performed? 
What if the step is performed incorrectly? 
The process requires minimal retraining, since it often uses the same team (or subset of the 
team). The technique is able to identify unique “causes” typically missed in a process PrHA, 
especially when humans are expected to perform special tasks only occasionally. 
The process is currently focused on manual procedures such as: 
Startup and shutdown 
Commissioning/decommissioning equipment for maintenance 
Maintenance on active equipment 
Emergency shutdown and restart (abnormal operating procedures) 
Manual retrieval and transfer procedures. 
Required PrHA Hazard Evaluation Study Information 
The PrHA process is only as good as the design and/or process/operation information that is 
available to the hazard evaluation team. As noted earlier, the level of design maturity determines 
the availability of design, process, and operational information. The PrHA hazard analysis 
workshops are not held until the information has been collected. CH2M HILL requires the 
following the information according to different stages of a project: 
Conceptual Design 
Minimum study information: 
- Incident information related to similar equipmentkystems/processes 
- Chemical/radiochemical inventory 
- Process or block flow diagram 
- Equipment performance requirements (flow, pressure, temperature, etc.) 
- Material Safety Data Sheets (MSDS) for process chemicals, working fluids 
- Process/system description (may be developed specifically for PrHA meeting) 
- Lists of existing structures, systems, and components (SSC) and TSRs. 
- Any preliminary hazard categorization or safety analysis results 
Preliminary/Detailed Design 
Minimum study information: 
- Results of prior PrHAs performed on the design 
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- 
- Chemicaliradiochemical inventory 
- P&IDs 
- Equipmentifacility general arrangement drawings or photographs 
- Processisystem description (formal description required for detailed design) 
- Process Control Plan or Preliminary Control Plan (if one exists) 
- Process flowsheetimaterial balance (if available) 
- MSDS for process chemicals, working fluids 
- Safety analysis resultsicontrols and lists of existing SSCs and TSRs (if available) 
- Normal process/system operating parameters 
- Maximum performance specifications of procured equipment (flow, pressure, 
temperature, etc.) 
Valve and instrumentation data sheets (depending on design maturity) 
Preliminaryifinal operating procedures (if available) 
Applicable chemical reaction equations and stoichiometry for primary and important 
secondary or side reactions 
Incident information related to similar equipmenVsystemsiprocesses 
- 
- 
- 
Design Changes 
The level of information necessary to evaluate a change to either a previously studied 
detail design or a proposed change to an existindoperating system is similar to the level 
of information required for the original full study of the system during preliminaryidetail 
design. In addition, if a number of changes are outstanding against the key study 
drawings (P&IDs), it is necessary to make a preliminary update to the drawings to 
incorporate the changes so that representative drawinds of the proposed system are 
available for study. If the outstanding changes are minor, they are marked up on the 
drawings prior to and during the study. 
The following information is required as a minimum: 
- 
- 
- ChemicaliRadiochemical inventory 
- 
- 
Incident information related to similar equipmentisystemsiprocesses 
Results of prior PrHAs performed on the system/equipment/process 
P&IDs - updated as necessary to reflect proposed final change configuration 
EquipmentiFacility General Arrangement drawings - updated as necessary to reflect 
proposed final change configuration 
Normal and maximum equipmentisystem performance information (flow, pressure, 
temperature, etc.) 
Lists of existing SSCs and TSRs. 
MSDSs for process chemicals, working fluids 
Process Control Plan (if one exists) 
Preliminaryifinal operating procedures (if available) 
- 
- Available existing safety analysisicontrols 
- 
- 
- 
- 
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Procedure Changes 
- Requires well-defined procedures 
- Requires a well-trained leader and experienced workers on the team. 
Identification of Hazard Controls 
A major responsibility of the PrHA hazard analysis workshop team is qualitatively identifying 
hazardous conditions as “acceptable” or “unacceptable.” Of course, it is recognized that almost 
no hazardous conditions are acceptable without identification of some level of 
controls/safeguards. 
The CH2M HILL PrHA process addresses hazard control in four ways: 
1. Identification of changes in a design or process to eliminate or reduce the potential for 
events that impact safety or operation (including industrial accidents and environmental 
impacts). 
2. Identification of various controls that eliminate or reduce the potential for events 
(existing or proposed hardware and procedures). 
3. Identification of controls to protect the environment (existing or proposed hardware, 
procedures, and permit requirements). 
4. Development of DSAs, TSRs, and preliminary documented safety analyses (requires 
additional evaluation and selection of controls by the Nuclear Safety and Licensing 
[NS&L] organization). 
Actions and commitments related to existing DSA controls and non-TSR controls are required to 
be identified and agreed to during the hazard evaluation. Non-SSC/TSR controls developed 
during the hazard evaluation process are documented as they are identified, including 
information related to any alternatives discussed and rationale for selection and dismissal. 
Control Selection Philosophy 
Control selection to address radioactive and other hazardous material release events is based on 
the following strategy at all stages of design development: 
1. Minimize hazardous material presence 
2. Select SSCs over Administrative Controls 
3. Select passive SSCs over active SSCs 
4. Select preventative controls over mitigative controls 
5 .  Select facility safety SSCs over personal protective equipment 
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6. Select controls closest to the hazard 
7. Select controls that are effective for multiple hazards. 
Hazard Mapping 
The PrHA process does not end with the completion of the PrHA workshop meetings. The 
hazardous condition information developed during the meetings is evaluated to determine what 
impacts it has on the current hazard information contained in the DSA Hazard Analysis Database 
and in the Emergency Process Hazards Analysis (EPHA). This is accomplished by “mapping” 
each hazardous condition to a existing DSA hazardous condition and to an applicable EPHA 
analyzed condition. Hazardous conditions that do not “map” require further evaluation through 
the CH2M HlLL NS&L and Emergency Management programs. 
PrHA Review and Closeout Meetings 
One or more PrHA review meetings are held after the initial PrHA study meetings in order to 
review progress of completing actions resulting from the PrHA workshop meetings and further 
analysis activities. Because the PrHA process tends to be iterative, more than one review meeting 
is often necessary. 
In addition to the review meetings, a closeout meeting is required to be held before the 
design/process change is accepted for use. During this meeting all actions and commitments are 
verified as complete and closed or justification and continuing tracking is required. 
Conclusion 
Management of risk is necessary for a DOE contractor to meet the expectations of the customer. 
Developing and complying with the requirements of a DSA is only a part of what is necessary to 
accomplish this. CH2M HILL has implemented a process hazards analysis approach that 
supports the needs of all of the functions of the company that use hazard information. The needs 
of the DSA are met, but also the needs of environmental protection, emergency management, 
industrial and radiological safety, and operational excellence. The key to achieving this is 
twofold: 
Manage change by ensuring that ALL changes undergo the appropriate scrutiny 
Address the risks of changes through early and continuing identification of a broad 
spectrum of controls (design, hardware, and procedures) that address all of the 
consequences of concern. 
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